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INTRODUCTION
BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYMPOSIUM
TROTTER HARDY*
You have in your hands thirteen papers on intellectual property,'
written by some of the most outstanding and widely recognized
scholars working in the area today. What a collection of probing
analyses, on topics ranging from the morality of patents, 2 to the
"Goldilocks hypothesis,"3 to the relationship of TOFU to fair use,4 to
the secret gay love affair between Captain Kirk and Dr. Spock!5
Don't believe me? Read on ...

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Technology, William & Mary School of
Law.
1. If I were inclined to puns, I might characterize this issue of the Review as a "Selden
v. Baker's dozen" papers-but of course, I wouldn't actually say anything that silly in a formal
work of scholarship.
2. See Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention CreationActivity Boundary in Patent Law,
51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 577 (2009).
3. See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345 (2009).
4. See Jason Mazzone, AdministeringFair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 395 (2009).
5. I caution readers that this relationship has not been officially confirmed by the
copyright holders of the Star Trek series; please see Rebecca Tushnet's article, Economies of
Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM.& MARY L. REV. 513 (2009)-a
slashing critique of the most fundamental principles underpinning copyright law-for details.
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THE BOUNDARIES OF COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK/CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW

Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the
Boundaries of the Firm
As long as we are supposing things, let's suppose that Walt
Disney had sold the Disney empire during his lifetime and gone on
to another venture. Could his previous business really lay claim to
the "Disney" name, even in the face of a contractual conveyance of
good will? Would Disney himself be justified in associating his name
with the new venture--or more precisely, are there limits on truthtelling that the sale of the old business imposes on Disney's ability
to so associate himself?
Eponymous problems like this arise quite often in trademark law,
when founders (think "Bill Marriott," 'Martha Stewart," "Henry
Ford," and so on) are closely associated with the success or quality
of a firm's products and services. As Dan Burk and Brett McDonnell
discuss in Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, the issue
has facets that carry well beyond "pure" trademark law. Following
their previous investigations of patent and copyright law, the two
authors here ask about the effects of trademark rules and doctrine
on the size and structure of firms. Does trademark law affect a
firm's decision to "make or buy" components, or the entirety, of its
products? How does that law relate to franchise operations? Why
are some gas stations owned by franchisees and others owned by the
franchising company itself?
These sorts of questions have been studied in the economics
literature. But Burk and McDonnell place them, rather surprisingly,
into the context of trademark law. Take the knotty task of disentangling the good will associated with a business founder like Disney
personally and the good will associated with the business and its
products apart from the founder. When the issue arises in litigation,
ex post, the question is often one of pure trademark law. Yet Burk
and McDonnell show how that trademark law also has consequences
ex ante, in structuring the firm and playing a consequential role in
business decisions like "make or buy."
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The whole question gives Burk and McDonnell the occasion for
developing a deliciously novel paper probing the intersection of
trademark law, business decision making, and economic analysis.
Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use
Fair use-ahhh, fair use. What a problem area. Not only is it
perpetually vague and unpredictable, as Jason Mazzone reminds
us in Administering Fair Use, but frequently these days content
providers insist that users waive their rights even to activities that
are otherwise routinely acknowledged as being fair. Mazzone quotes
from several "click-through" contracts, such as the highly restrictive
one from the U.S. News web site prohibiting almost anything but
"reading' their college rankings (rankings that, to be sure, might
fall on the "fictional" side of the fact-fiction dichotomy in any event)
for illustration. The practice is far from confined to web contracts:
literary copyright holders can also indulge in attempts at draconian
restrictions on use-the James Joyce estate is especially vigilant to
ensure that no use-no use-of Joyce's writings is possible without
express permission. Music download services like iTunes and
Amazon are equally eager to hem in the uses that users can make
of copyrighted downloads, and to hem them in far more restrictively
than fair use doctrine would require.
We are in danger, suggests Mazzone, of fair use no longer imposing limits on copyright's reach, as it was intended to do, but
rather becoming just "one more area that copyright owners control."6
Commentators often urge a variety of remedies for the twin
problems of vagueness and copyright owner over-reaching, such as
the addition of more explicit exceptions in the Copyright Act, or
better guidance to courts or the public about the true scope of fair
use. Mazzone takes us, however, down another path with his
approach to resolving these notorious fair use problems. Why could
not we, he suggests, create an independent government agency to
administer fair use? He goes on to sketch out two possible models
for such an agency, arguing that the administrative approach is
both consistent with "the Administrative/Regulatory State" of
6. Mazzone, supranote 4, at 412.
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today's world, but more importantly, a useful way of turning some
of the endless malleability and unpredictability of the fair use
standards into a publically informed and much more predictable set
of fair use rules.
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform
One might say that "the rubber meets the road" in copyright
litigation when damages are assessed. Copyright professors and
practitioners alike are keenly aware that damages come in two
forms: actual and statutory. Congress understood, even under the
1909 Act, that in many cases actual damages are hard to prove for
copyright infringements; hence the statute, both then and now, has
spelled out a range of damage awards that courts could grant
successful plaintiffs in the absence of proof of actual damages.
But what a range. Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland, in
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform,
point out that the ratio of the largest possible statutory damages to
the smallest has greatly increased over time, from 20:1 in 1909, to
200:1 today for the comparable range. Taking into account the low
end of the range for "innocent infringement"
that was added to the
7
1976 Act, today's ratio is actually 750:1.
Even more striking, statutory damages today appear to be
awarded without any manifest principle for what constitutes an
appropriate choice within the range. Samuelson and Wheatland
demonstrate how courts occasionally award damages well below
what seems appropriate, but more and more today award statutory
7. Samuelson and Wheatland note that the 1909 Act's measure was for courts to award
the statutory damage figure "per infringement," whereas the current law's measure is to
award damages per infringed work. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.439, 453
(2009). In any event, under the 1909 Act, that range was between $250 and $5000, or a ratio
of 20:1. Id. at 455 n.61. Under the 1976 Act as enacted, that ratio was raised to 40:1 ($250 to
$10,000) for "ordinary" infringement, and to 200:1 (up to $50,000) for exceptional, "willful,"
infringements. Id. at 455 nn.61-62. And even that ratio has since been increased: the upper
end for willful infringement damages is now $150,000, which gives us a ratio of 200:1. Id. As
the 1976 Act also allows a new lower end of $200 for innocent infringement, the full range of
damages per infringed work is from $200 to $150,000, or an astonishing ratio of 750:1! Id. at
455,n.61.
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damages that are astonishingly high in relation to any conceivable
harm to the copyright owner. Many readers will know the recent
case involving Jamie Thomas, who was found liable for "file sharing"
a couple of dozen songs. The copyright plaintiffs' actual damages
were assessed by the court at $50; but plaintiffs elected statutory
damages, and were awarded over $220,000 (and as very recent news
reports describe, on retrial the jury awarded plaintiffs just under
two million dollars!).
With the range of maximum to minimum damages as great as it
is, with courts seemingly bending over backwards to find "willfulness" in routine infringement cases, with juries ready to award
astonishingly large verdicts in relation to harm done, and with the
whole process veering away from the fundamental scheme of
statutory damages envisioned by Congress, the time is ripe to revisit
the statutory damages issue and Samuelson and Wheatland do just
that. They not only canvass the cases and persuasively demonstrate
that something is seriously amiss; they also lay out a careful, comprehensive, and practical approach that courts can take to bring
some principled consistency and fairness to future statutory
damage cases. (If, like me, you have tended to short-change the
damages issue when teaching a copyright course, Samuelson and
Wheatland's article will come as a much needed eye-opener that will
change your ways.)
Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire:FairUse and Marketplace
Assumptions
I often teach my own students, at the outset of a semester's course
in copyright law or IP law generally, that the most fundamental
principle undergirding our entire intellectual property regime is
"incentives." We want to give would-be creators an incentive to
create and to bring their creations to the public's attention; in the
absence of any way to prevent free-riding, we would see a greatly
reduced and hence sub-optimal quantity and quality of creativity
output.
And then I read Rebecca Tushnet's paper, Economies of Desire:
FairUse and MarketplaceAssumptions. Best of all, I read it during
a late evening summer rain here in Williamsburg (literally), which
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meant that it was a dark and stormy night when I learned that I
will never be a novelist. I will not be a novelist because I lack the
(for me) startling degree of passion for story-telling that Tushnet
describes as common in writers. Drawing on writers' comments
themselves, as well as studies of writers, Tushnet emphasizes how
very different are the perceptions, motivations, and sometimes
downright irrationality of these creative individuals from the usual
dry copyright story premised on rational, dispassionate responses
to incentives.
Most intriguing is Tushnet's vivid depiction of the world of "fan
fiction," where well known characters like Superman and Dr. Spock
find themselves in new tales and adventures-perhaps even in
love-thanks to the creative imaginings of their fans. Among many
provocative questions, Tushnet asks whether copyright doctrines,
especially fair use, ought not to be markedly different when applied
in a world like fan fiction, where the principle of incentives seems
so markedly at variance with the actual facts of creators' motivations.
I confess that I am precisely the sort of person who responds well
to the dry and tidy story of copyright-as-incentive; Tushnet's observations came as a clap of thunder (and hence were copyrightable, I
suppose) that jarred me into taking a fresh look at my own assumptions. I do not doubt that they will do the same for other copyright
scholars as well.
Jane Winn & Nicolas Jondet, A New Deal for End Users? Lessons
from a French Innovation in the Regulation of Interoperability
For most American legal scholars, France exemplifies the strong,
pro-author stance of copyright law that we often associate with the
European, or "moral rights," approach to copyright protection. Jane
Winn and Nicolas Jondet draw our attention in A New Deal for End
Users? Lessons from a French Innovation in the Regulation of
Interoperabilityto a different and surprising side of French law, the
protection of consumers of copyrighted material. French legislators
in 2007 had become concerned that proprietary digital rights management schemes in the music industry-most notably, Apple's
"FairPlay" technology, used at the time with iTunes and iPods-
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were limiting consumer choices and hampering the growth of the
digital music business by preventing economies of scale. To combat the problems arising from DRM (or 'Technical Protection
Measures," as they are better known in the E.U.), they formed an
independent regulatory agency charged with promoting interoperability among consumer-oriented digital media and devices.
This agency will be known (it seems to be yet aborning in mid-2009)
as the Regulatory Authority for Technical Measures, or "ARMT" as
its French acronym.
One finds it hard to imagine the U.S. Congress enacting an
administrative agency to do the same thing. The equivalent here
would be a Regulatory Authority for Digital Rights Management,
charged with promoting interoperability among digital music
players and services. But the contrast between American and
French law on competition, as Winn and Jondet explain, is part and
parcel of the very significant differences between the United States
and the French (and European) approaches to the regulatory state
generally.
How will such an agency function once it is up and running? Will
it actually increase interoperability, or will it be subject to regulatory capture by content providers? Winn and Jondet ponder this
question, taking due notice of recently proposed legislation that
would broaden the agency's mission to include the prevention of
unauthorized music downloads. One might well ask whether an
agency would become schizophrenic with such a combination of
missions, but certainly the French approach is on the cutting edge
of regulatory experimentation-an apt response, perhaps, to cutting
edge technologies?
THE BOUNDARIES OF PATENT LAW
Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention CreationActivity
Boundary in Patent Law
Suppose you could create a life-saving drug that would rescue
millions from disease and suffering. This drug would, needless to
say, be novel and useful and nonobvious, and hence eminently
patentable. The only catch is that to make the drug, you must
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murder a few innocent people. Is it still patentable? Should the
Patent Office care? After all, the cost-benefit ratio seems pretty
clearly to be on your side, doesn't it?
The example, which Margo Bagley draws from a fictional literary
work in her piece on The New Invention CreationActivity Boundary
in Patent Law, is extreme, but the issue it raises is not. Moral
questions can most certainly be implicated by inventive activity;
take research involving stem cells, or the patenting of animal (not
to say, human) life generally, or my own hypothetical: a patent
sought for an improved process to accomplish late-term abortions.
Aside from the infrequently invoked requirement of "utility" in this
context, U.S. patent law does not typically specify moral constraints
on the patentability of inventions. But, as Bagley shows, there is
good reason to consider a different approach. European Union
patent law, for example, does have explicit moral constraints: a
patent may not be granted on any invention that involves the use of
human embryos. Bagley assesses the merits of such provisions, and
their likely interpretative difficulties, urging a cautious approach.
John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of
Patentability
Practitioners and academics both understand the tension between
law as a set of "standards," with inherent ambiguity and the
requirement of substantial interpretation, and law as a set of
"rules," in which bright lines inform us of our obligations-even
when the imposition of those obligations would be unfair. Patent
law, no less than any other area of the law, evidences that tension.
But in patent law, courts have tended to shift unpredictably
between the two approaches, even in regard to major patent law
principles, switching over time from standards to rules and back
again.
One might have thought that such shifts in the patent arena were
a product of a time when Congress had not yet centralized patent
appeals in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).
Indeed, the problem of shifting interpretations of legal principles
from circuit to circuit was a significant factor in causing Congress
to create the court, which was institutionally designed to bring
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consistency to a then-inconsistent area of law. Yet John Duffy
draws our attention to the way even the CAFC and its predecessor
court have shifted between rules and standards in several key
areas, as he addresses in Rules and Standards on the Forefront of
Patentability.
I doubt that patent scholars would have guessed around the time
of its creation that the CAFC (along with its predecessor, the Court
of Claims) would change its views on a fundamental question like
"what is patent law's subject matter?" some three times in thirty
years! Depending on how involved in patent law you are, you might
laugh or cry as Duffy relates how the court announced in 1999 the
end of subject-matter unpredictability with its Alappat and State
Street rules; and then changed that same law-expressly disavowing
those cases-in its Bilski opinion in 2008.
These shifts in the approach to the most basic patent law
question-subject matter-do not provide the guidance to investment in inventive activity that society might like, to say the least.
But what is the best approach for the CAFC to take? Investment
decisions are more knowledgeably made when we have rules, not
standards. Duffy looks at a long history of patent cases and concludes that for patent law specifically, the inflexibility of a rulesbased approach will always, inevitably, crumble in the face of an
ever-changing technological landscape.
What to do? Duffy concludes, counterintuitively, that fixed rules
-albeit destined to become inadequate or pointless with changing
technology-nevertheless offer the best outcome. Such rules provide
reasonably clear guidance to investors for the rules' duration, but
even more importantly, as he intriguingly shows, fixed rules later
abandoned have often in practice served to highlight problems in
patent law doctrine, problems that were eventually solved with
newer and (one hopes) better approaches than those of the abandoned rules.
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Mark A. Lemley, DistinguishingLost Profits from Reasonable
Royalties
In his DistinguishingLost Profits from Reasonable Royalties,
Mark Lemley observes a curious phenomenon in patent damages
awards. Only two types of awards are possible under the statute:
lost profits or a reasonable royalty. The former is appropriate when
the patentee either was or would have been actually making and
selling the patented invention. Sales by an infringer almost
necessarily reduce the patentee's sales in such cases, and usually
profits as well, so 'lost profits" is a sensible basis to use to put the
patentee in the same position it would have been in absent the
infringement.
Reasonable royalties, on the other hand, are appropriate when
the patentee would not have engaged in actual sales of the patented
invention, but would have licensed the invention to others. In such
cases, Lemley points out, "lost profits" do not describe the patentee's
losses whereas lost royalty payments most certainly do.
A problem arises here, though, because the CAFC, which hears
appeals in patent cases from all federal district courts, has set up
quite strict requirements for proof of lost profits, requirements so
strict that many patentees who almost certainly did lose sales
cannot prove lost sales and must resort to the royalty remedy. And
the particular problem with this trend is that courts-having
zealously avoided an erroneous measure of lost profits--often turn
around and overcompensate the patentee by awarding royalties
that in many cases exceed the value of their lost profits. The
"reasonable royalty" doctrine is thus becoming encrusted with all
manner of sub-doctrines that are only properly applied in the lost
profits situation. Lemley lays out this scenario with a characteristically thoughtful analysis. One does not ordinarily think that courts
need to be reminded of what the text of a statute says, but Lemley
shows how very much they do need to be reminded in patent
damages cases. Especially is that necessary when the statute
merely directs courts to do what they seem more and more not to do:
ensure that "damages" in patent cases really do measure some sort
of actual harm to the patent owner.
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Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities
Lots of people are unhappy about our present patent system. A
common objection is that too many patents are granted by the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) on "inventions" not worthy of
the name. Not surprisingly, proposals for reform abound; a good
many of these proposals call for better patent examination in the
PTO, which in turn implies either more examiners, or better trained
examiners, or both-which would, of course, necessitate greater
costs for running the Patent Office. Michael Meurer takes a different tack in Patent Examination Priorities: are there ways in
which the PTO could reallocate examiners' time to produce better
outcomes without increasing costs?
The revolutionary implications of such a proposal counsel caution,
and Meurer sets out the groundwork for the competing considerations that any such reallocation would entail. He starts out by
asking the basic questions: how bad would it be if the PTO issued
too many patents, versus how bad it would be if it issued too few?
"Too many" would mean that some issued patents should not have
been issued; "too few," of course, would mean just the opposite. This
classification reflects the well-known analysis of 'Type I' and 'Type
II" errors in statistics, but Meurer goes well beyond that simple
dichotomy. He suggests that at least three errors might be made
in relation to three outcomes. First, a patent application might be
denied; second, a patent might be granted with a narrow scope of
claims; and finally, a patent might be granted with a broad scope of
claims. That tripartite classification in turn implies that the number
of "errors" is greater than two, and indeed there turn out to be six
types of erroneous examination outcomes. Without listing them all
here, we can just note that, for example, one erroneous outcome
would be that a patent that should be issued with a narrow scope
might be issued with a broad scope, or it might not be issued at all.
And so on.
This line of thinking leads Meurer to set out many intriguing
possibilities. Perhaps certain technologies should get increased
examination scrutiny and others less; perhaps certain application
characteristics should trigger a more intensive review, such as
the number of claims in an application, or the number of prior art
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references; perhaps the PTO should develop a rule that all patents
are granted unless it is perfectly clear that they should not and that
a decision on that clarity can be reached with little examiner time
and effort; or perhaps the rule should be that no patents are granted
unless it is perfectly clear that they should be and a decision on that
sort of clarity can be reached with little examiner time and effort.
The possibilities are many. Among Meurer's contributions to this
issue-in addition to bringing these possibilities to light in the first
place, a major contribution in its own right-is that of being
realistic. He notes, as have others, that the PTO's current overall
incentive for examiners is to be "customer oriented," a policy that
comes awfully close to an acknowledgement that the PTO has
succumbed to "regulatory capture." Incentives that grow from PTO
policies like that need to be analyzed and quite likely changed as
part of any redeployment of examiner resources.
CROSSING BOUNDARIES

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a PrivateInternational
IntellectualPropertyLaw: The Demise of Territoriality?
The public international law of intellectual property has been
around at least since the late 19th century, as exemplified by the
Paris and Berne conventions in the 1880s.8 Scholars and practitioners alike have paid attention to this area of the law ever since and
especially of late, thanks to the world-changing TRIPS intellectual
property agreement of the mid-90s. But surprisingly, until quite
recently, scholars have paid far less attention to the private
international law of intellectual property, including such fundamentals as choice of law questions in cross-border intellectual property
disputes. And yet, needless to say, the issues that arise in that
context have consequences that matter.
Graeme Dinwoodie describes the situation in Developing a
Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of
8. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was signed in 1883; the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works followed in 1886. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private InternationalIntellectual Property Law: The
Demise of Territorality?,51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 714 n.1 (2009).
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Territoriality?Dinwoodie lays out several questions that very much
call for answers in this context: What is the current state of private
international intellectual property law? With the past few decades
seeing a remarkable expansion of global trade, particularly in
intellectual property goods like motion pictures and music, is that
body of law adequate? How should it be changed? And finally, if
change is needed, what institutional mechanism would best
accomplish the purpose? Although emphasizing the first of those
questions in his analysis over the fourth, Dinwoodie nevertheless
sheds much light on all of them.
Among other remarkable conclusions, Dinwoodie offers per suasive reasons for sharply discounting the primary role of
"territoriality" in private international law. Those readers who have
tried to teach at least some bits of international intellectual
property law will know-if nothing else-the signal role that
"territoriality" takes on in international law thinking. Our own
Supreme Court has often referenced this principle, as, for example,
in the Deepsouth Packing case.9
But as Dinwoodie notes, "[o]ne can adhere to the basic premises that underlie territoriality without supporting the full range
of rules of intellectual property law that are said to reflect the
principle."' In fact, he goes further than that, offering suggestions
for how and where the territoriality principle would benefit from a
"reconfiguration." His are thoughtful proposals from one of the
preeminent scholars in the field, and one hopes that they will have
concrete effect on the jurisprudence in this area.
Dinwoodie himself is optimistic on some fronts. He wonders
whether courts are institutionally competent to resolve international intellectual property questions, ultimately concluding that
indeed they are. His conclusion is based in part on the very
phenomenon of globalization itself, whereby increasingly easy and
frequent communications across national borders has facilitated
9. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529-31 (1972). In Deepsouth
Packing Co., the Court held that the manufacture of component parts of an invention, shipped
abroad for assembly and use, did not infringe a patent on the completely assembled machine.
Id. at 524, 531-32. The Court cited the importance of territoriality in its decision, id. at 531,
and has referenced both that principle and that case many times since. See, e.g., Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 439-40 (2007).
10. Dinwoodie, supra note 8, at 715-16.
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for judges, just as much as for others, what he delightfully terms
the "soft socially driven convergence of ideas" about intellectual
property law." If you are interested in international intellectual
property law, or if you are familiar with and accept the "territoriality" principle, Dinwoodie's paper is a must-read.
Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual
Boundaries
All transactions generate "spillovers"--ubiquitous side effects, or
"externalities" that ripple through society. Brett Frischmann, along
with Mark Lemley, has explored some of the ramifications of these
spillover effects in a previous article. 2 Here, Frischmann further
explores this theme, suggesting that to a considerable extent, the
significance of spillovers is in the eye of the beholder. One can, he
says, easily incorporate spillovers as externalities in the classic
economic view of copyright law as a means of converting otherwise
external benefits-the value to consumers of creative works in the
absence of copyright-to internal ones, captured by the author.
But one can equally easily regard spillovers as exogenous to an
economic analysis, in which case the economic explanation of
copyright law falls quite short of being full and satisfactory.
Frischmann shows how the analysis of spillovers from intellectual
property transactions differs sharply according to the preconceptions and philosophy of the analyst. He notes that nearly all
economic explanations of intellectual property laws take the
viewpoint of the author, or promoter, or distributer, and so on, and
hence examine the question as one of what sort of incentives are
needed to induce the "supply" of creative works. In this economic
realm, the matter is purely a "supply side" issue, in short. But what
about the other side? Should we not concern ourselves equally with
the "demand-side theory of what [intellectual] 'Progress' we want"?1 3

11. Id. at 798.
12. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007).
13. Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its ConceptualBoundaries,51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 803, 807 (2009).
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Frischmann goes on to show how the theories of property and the
reliance on property rights as the best method of internalizing
otherwise beneficial externalities go along with this "supply side"
orientation. These sorts of externalities are usually regarded as
more or less measurable, and hence to be factored into the equation
that produces "property rights" as its result. It is this analysis that
rejects consideration of any spillover effects that cannot readily be
measured. But perhaps that's too hasty: in Frischmann's view, the
presence even of unquantifiable spillovers can justify changes to
intellectual property law. In particular, he argues that many
spillovers relevant to intellectual property transactions should be
explicitly identified, encouraged, and left to remain external--even
at times when it might be cost-justified to correct the externalities.
Frischmann's is an unexpected approach to externalities that will,
as so many of these papers will, compel readers to reexamine longheld beliefs about the general theory of intellectual property law.
Laura A. Heymann, How to Write a Life: Fixationand the
Copyright/PrivacyDivide
Fixation marks the divide between a potential author's subjective
concepts and the existence of an objective, commodifiable subject-the work of authorship. Fixation, at least when made of
something original to the author, creates a copyright, which in turn
imbues the author with a right of control over the work. In many
troublesome cases, this author's right is directly opposed to a quite
different right, that of privacy. Commonly, though certainly not
exclusively, this tension arises with photography, when the photographer "captures" the image of another individual. Copyright law
says that the photographer has acquired a right of control over the
photograph; but the right of privacy (assuming that its prerequisites
are satisfied) says that the subject of the photograph has acquired
a competing interest in controlling at least certain uses of that same
copyrighted work.
Laura Heymann shows us in How to Write a Life: Fixation and
the Copyright/PrivacyDivide that the familiar "fixation" requirement of copyright law really accomplishes a dual purpose: not only
does it mark the birth of some copyrighted subject matter, but it
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also freezes that subject matter and pulls it forever out of context.
Fixation thus creates and forms a subject in the first place, enabling
that subject to become commodified, packaged, alienated-to be
controlled. On the other hand, privacy law is all about giving control
to the subject itself-the very opposite of copyright's grant of control
over the subject copyrighted.
Heymann explores this clash of copyright and privacy law,
assessing the differences brought about by different privacy
theories, from the "right to be let alone" to the right of publicity. She
traces the history of the fixation requirement in copyright law,
noting that in countless garden-variety copyright cases, the fixation
requirement poses no difficulty, but that in the digital world of
fleeting bits and bytes, fixation can be more problematic. Then she
begins to develop what I will call a philosophy of fixation, analyzing
its nature in the boundary cases such as jazz improvisation on a
copyrighted melody, where no particular performance is privileged
over any other and all may or may not be recorded. Indeed, recorded
music today, she observes, turns old principles on their head:
recording used to be considered the capture of an original-a live
performance-against which the recording could be assessed for
authenticity; but today, recording has primacy: a live performance
is assessed by audiences for how authentically it reproduces the
recording. Heymann's article is a remarkable tour through an area
of the law that has obviously been under-theorized to date-and it
is entertaining as well!
Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling
Many products carry multiple forms of intellectual property
protection: a patented or copyrighted product, for example, might be
sold under a particular trademark. At one point, roughly a hundred
years ago, courts cast a skeptical eye on such multiple protections,
as exemplified in the well-known "shredded wheat" case, in which
Kellogg was not permitted to retain that term as a trademark after
its patent had expired. Yet however one reads those earlier casesas judgments on multiple protections, or as a recognition that a
particular term no longer functioned as a mark-it is clear that
modern courts expressly allow multiple protections on the same
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item. Though far from inevitably so, courts today not only accept the
existence of multiple protections, but they also examine the scope of
rights under each such protection as though the other forms did not
exist. In An Alternate Approach to Channeling,Mark McKenna asks
whether that makes sense--or whether instead the law of intellectual property should take the simultaneous presence of other forms
of intellectual property protection into account in refining the scope
of each such protection.
Suppose a manufacturer of a patented drug also promotes
consumer loyalty through trademark branding, a not-uncommon
event. Suppose further that the patent finally expires. McKenna
cites authority for the counterintuitive proposition that many brandname drugs actually increase in price upon patent expiration and
the entry of generic competitors into the market. Obviously, the
brand name has something to do with that phenomenon; were the
manufacturer not able to use such a brand name on patent expiration, the drug's selling price would likely be closer to the "pure"
competitive price applicable to fungible goods.
McKenna goes on to point out something that I ought to have
thought about and never have: knowing that it will be able to
leverage post-patent consumer loyalty through brand-building
during the patent term, a manufacturer will apportion its investments in inventive activity accordingly. For example, more investment would go into the development of patented products for which
building consumer loyalty is a more likely prospect than for other
research activities. Is that how we want to channel research
investments, asks McKenna?
CONCLUSION

If you were not convinced at the outset of this Introduction that
the following collection of papers will generously reward your
reading, I hope you are now; you should be. So my parting advice is
this: don't just do something-sit there and read these papers! They
are fascinating, far-reaching, and supremely relevant to today's
intellectual property landscape; besides, they will just plain teach
you a lot that you did not know before.

